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"It is better to fail in originality than to succeed in imitation."
-Herman Melville
1. THE SUCCESSFUL SONGWRITER'S VICTIMIZATION THROUGH
FRIVOLOUS COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT LAWSUITS

Songwriters who have hit the big-time in the world of music
seem to have all of the right accouterments on their side: fame,
fortune, prestige, support for projects from record companies, and
long-time fans who are willing to buy more of whatever they have
to offer. These famous artists seem to excel in everything they
compose while to the small-time, fledgling songwriters who may
work hard at similar goals that never reach the same fruition.
Sometimes, the less successful songwriter as a plaintiff may feel
enormously unprotected and insecure in a copyright infringement
action in which he is pitted against a well-known artist, solely
because of the artist's sheer popularity and the experienced counsel
artists of this magnitude are able to attain for representation.
However, it is not always the unknown songwriter who suffers in
copyright infringement lawsuits. The well-known artist can also
fall prey to actions which unjustifiably accuse him of the theft of
the songs which are in actuality his own original creations.' The
exact amenities that pummeled a songwriter into superstardom can
also drag him into court or drawn-out settlement negotiations with
plaintiffs who are not even actual composers of the song in
question. Perhaps these plaintiffs and their lawyers institute these
copyright infringement lawsuits in an effort to reach the same type
of success through a desired court-ordered fame or money.
Baseless copyright infringement can affect anyone. Successful
1 See Howard Siegel, Sitting Duck Songwriters and Frivolous Lawsuits, 9
ENT. ARTS & SPORTS L. J. 24 (1997). In his article, Mr. Siegel addresses the

seriousness of frivolous music copyright infringement lawsuits and suggests
careful consideration of this issue from practitioners:
Recent highly publicized courtroom dramas have focused an entire
nation on the workings of our legal system, often spawning dismay
and calls for reform. A less visible but equally disconcerting defect in
our civil system also cries out for reform and, pending such reform,
mandates the thoughtful attention of all music industry practitioners.
Id..
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/3
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songwriters and their lawyers are just as prone to headaches and
heartaches over the wrongful use of their songs as would be a less
successful plaintiff/songwriter who discovers that another has
misappropriated his work.'
Frivolous lawsuits pertaining to infringement in music
copyrights have caused much concern for practitioners in this area.3
When established songwriters stand accused of copyright
infringement, cases are often decided on summary judgment
motions.' If the songwriter wins his motion, he has still invested
time and incurred costs for his defense. If he loses, he proceeds to
trial where he can possibly triumph on the merits. Even if he does
prevail at trial, however, resources have been spent in preparation
for litigation. In either case, the successful songwriter has
expended much effort, time and money defending himself and his
own independent creation, usually without receiving any type of
restitution (i.e., attorney's fees) under the Copyright Act.' A
successful defense against an infiingement claim can hardly be
2. Id..
3. See generally Id.. See also Irwin Chusid, Lip-Sync Court Verdict is
Travesty; Buyers of Album Got the Music They Wanted BILLBOARD, Oct. 26,
1991, at 10, Twenty-six separate lawsuits concerning the Milli Vanilli lip-sync
controversy were filed against Arista Records, the group's label, by the alleged
victims. Id. A Cook County judge in Chicago gave preliminary approval to a
settlement of a class action suit that arose from Fabrice Morvan and Rob Pilatus'
admission that they had not actually sung on their "Girl You Know It's True"
album. Id. The settlement proposed that individuals providing proof of
purchase of the album would be entitled to a $1.00 rebate for Milli Vanilli
singles, $2.00 for vinyl albums and cassettes, and $3.00 for videos and compact
discs. Id. "The national pastime isn't baseball. And it isn't football or sex. It's
frivolous litigation." Id.
4. "Summary judgment will be granted only if the movant shows that (1)
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and (2) movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Civ. P. 56. See Also Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); See also Alan J. Hartnick, Summary Judgment in
Copyrightsfrom Cole Porter to Superman, 3 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 53
(1983) (recognizing that summary judgment is appropriate in copyright
infringement cases).
5. See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1996) (providing for costs and attorney's fees at the
court's election as remedies for copyright infringement) . Although attorney's
fees are a possible remedy for copyright infringement, it is not the normal
practice of courts to grant them. Lieb v. Topstone Indus., 788 F.2d 151, 154 (3d
Cir. 1986) (holding that the prevailing party should not be awarded attorney's
fees as aby
matter
ofCommons@DePaul,
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called "winning" the case when the defendant pays an enormous
cost for representation without receiving reimbursement.6
One can envision the problems that develop when a certain artist
is constantly sued, especially when the artist consistently prevails
at trial.' Not only do financial concerns arise, but the time which
an "alleged" infringing defendant expends litigation meritless suits
detracts from the time he spends being a creative artist.8 Through
frivolous copyright infringement lawsuits, the songwriter evolves
into a victim of the legal system, anchored by the very artistic
endeavors that she expects to be protected by the law.9
This paper proposes that courts and practitioners employ a
combination of several aspects of existing law in an effort to
annihilate frivolity in music copyright infringement litigation. Part
II outlines the standard of proof for establishing copyright
infringement. Part I addresses the lack of guidance from courts
in determining what elements constitute frivolous actions in music
copyright infringement lawsuits. Part IV tracks Fogerty v. Fantasy
and discusses its relevance in aiding future defendants in copyright
infringement litigation by its elimination of the "dual standard."
Part V details the success of frivolity claims by defendants in
copyright infringement actions, examining Fogerty, Section 505 of
the American Bar
the Copyright Act,"0 Federal Rule 11,
Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 2 and the British
6. See Warner Bros. Inc. v. Dae Rim Trading, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 100, 111
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), rev'd, 877 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1989). A survey taken in 1985
concluded that "the average cost of a copyright litigation through trial in New
York City was between $58,000 and $107,000, with a median cost of $87,000."

Id.
7. Michael Jackson has served as a successful defendant in two recent bouts
of copyright infringement litigation. See Cartier v. Jackson, 59 F.3d 1046 (10th
Cir. 1995); Smith v. Jackson 84 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 1996).
8. "[I]f there were fewer baseless infringement lawsuits, artists, writers,
publishers, and record labels could spend less time as defendants and more time
as artists and creators, and the rest of us would benefit from the additional fruits
of their labor." Robert G. Sugarman & Joseph P. Salvo, Fogerty Lends
Credence to CopyrightLaw, BILLBOARD, March 19, 1994, at 8.
9 "Every successful songwriter is a potential target for meritless copyright
infringement lawsuits--and, under the present system, an all too easy one."
Siegel, supra note 1, at 24.
10. 17 U.S.C. § 505.
11. FED. R. CIv. P. 11.
12. MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3.1 (1996).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/3
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Rule.' 3
II. ESTABLISHING MUSIC COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT: ARNSTEIN V.
PORTER AND OTHER SUBSEQUENT JURISPRUDENCE

A. Arnstein v. Porter
The most commonly employed music copyright infringement
test is found in Arnstein v. Porter.14 In Arnstein, Ira Arnstein
brought a music copyright infringement action against composer
Cole Porter, claiming Porter infringed on several of his musical
compositions." The court in Arnstein set the standard of proof
necessary to establish copyright infringement of a musical
composition, which consists of a plaintiff proving (a) that the
defendant has copied from the plaintiff s copyrighted work, and (b)
that the copying, assuming it to be proved, went so far as to
constitute improper appropriation.' 6
The court stated that the evidence to prove copying can either
consist of defendant's admission that he copied, or of
circumstantial evidence through the defendant's access to the
plaintiffs works, from which the trier of fact can reasonably infer
copying. 7 The court added that no amount of evidence will suffice
to establish copying if no similarities between the works exist, but
if evidence of both access and similarities exist, the similarities
must be sufficient in order to prove copying. 8 If there is no
13. The "British Rule" allows for automatic recovery of attorney's fees by the
prevailing party in a case. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 518 (1994).
14. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 851

(1947).
15. Arnstein 154 F.2d at 464. The action was dismissed on Porter's
motion for summary judgment. Id. at 467.
16. Id. at 468. Also, as with any copyright action, a plaintiff must prove his
ownership of a valid copyright by showing: (1) originality in the author; (2)

copyrightability of the subject matter; (3) the citizenship status of the author in
order to permit a copyright claim; (4) compliance with the applicable statutory

formalities; and (5) (if the plaintiff is not the author), a transfer of rights or other
relationship between the plaintiff and the author so as to constitute the plaintiff
as the valid copyright claimant. 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 13.01[A] (1996).

17. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
18. Id.
Published
by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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evidence of access, the Arnstein court asserted that "the similarities
must be so striking as to preclude the possibility that plaintiff and
defendant independently arrived at the same result."19
Unlawful appropriation, or illicit copying, would arise only if
copying were established.2 ° The court discussed the fact that in
some cases, the similarities are so striking between the plaintiffs
and defendant's work that an inference of copying is justified in
order to prove improper appropriation.21 'ut such double-purpose
evidence is not required; that is, if copying is otherwise shown,
proof of improper appropriation need not consist of similarities
which, standing alone, would support an inference of copying." 2
The Arnstein court discussed the "lay-listener" test, which
employs the reactions of the jury in making an assessment of the
misappropriation of a composition.' At trial, the plaintiff may
play the songs in such a manner that they may seem to a jury to be
"inexcusably alike, in terms of the way in which lay listeners of
'
The court stated that the
such music would be likely to react."24
plaintiff may also utilize the expert testimony of musicians to aid
in determining the reactions of lay auditors, but stressed that this
testimony2 would in no way be controlling on the issue of illicit
copying. 5
Other cases have expanded on the lay listener test. Through
Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. HarrisongsMusic, Ltd.,26 and Selle v.
GibbY the courts have continued to focus on the "lay listener" test,
while adding other factors to determine whether copyright
infringement has taken place.

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
23. Id. at 473.
24. Id.
25. Id. "The impression made on the refined ears of musical experts or their
views as to the musical excellence of plaintiffs or defendants works are utterly
immaterial on the issue of misappropriation; for the views of such persons are
caviar to the general--and plaintiffs and defendant's compositions are not
caviar." Id.
26. 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affd sub nom. ABKCO
Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983).
27. 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/3
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B. Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongsmusic, Ltd.
In Harrisongs, former Beatle George Harrison's popular song,
"My Sweet Lord," was accused of being plagiarized from the
Instead of solely
successful earlier song, "He's So Fine."2'
focusing on jury lay listeners, the court relied more on the expert
witnesses used by each side and Harrison's access to "He's So
Fine."29 The court stated that Harrison arrived at a particular
combination of musical sounds "that pleased him as being one he
felt would be appealing to a prospective listener."3 The court
reasoned that Harrison knew this combination of sounds that
formed "My Sweet Lord" would work because his subconscious
mind was aware that it had worked before in the song "He's So
Fine." While the court emphasized that it believed Harrison did
not deliberately copy the music of "He's So Fine," it nevertheless
stated that it was clear that "My Sweet Lord" was the very same
song,32 but with different words, as "He's So Fine," and that
Harrison had access to the Chiffon's song.33 The court held that a
subconsciously accomplished copyright infringement had
occurred.34
C. Selle v. Gibb

28. HarrisongsMusic, 420 F. Supp. at 178. "He's So Fine" was composed
by Ronald Mack and recorded by the popular group The Chiffons. Id. Bright
Tunes Music Corporation is the owner of the copyright of the song. Id.
29. Id. at 178, 181.
30. Id. at 180.
31. Id.

32. Even Harold Barlow, Harrison's own experienced expert witness,
acknowledged that although the two motives of the songs were part of the public
domain, their implementation here was so unusual that he had never come
across such a unique sequential use of the sounds. Id. at 180 n.11.
33. Harrisongs Music, 420 F. Supp.. at 180-81. The court believed that
Harrison was aware of "He's So Fine" because the song was number one for five
weeks on the Billboard charts in the United States, in England, Harrison's home
land, it was number twelve on the charts on June 1, 1963, which was the same
date that a Beatles' song was number one. Id. at 179. "He's So Fine" was one of
the top hits in England for seven weeks in 1963. Id.
34. Id. at 181.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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In Selle v. Gibb,35 the Seventh Circuit relied even more on access
for determining whether copyright infringement had occurred.
Ronald Selle, an unknown composer, brought suit against the three
Gibb brothers, Barry, Robin, and Maurice, who were known
collectively as the internationally known singing group, the Bee
Gees, claiming that the Bee Gees' hit tune "How Deep Is Your
Love" had infringed the copyright of his song, "Let It End."36 The
extent of the public dissemination of Selle's song was very limited;
he played "Let It End" several times with his small band in the
Chicago area, and sent tape recordings and sheet music of the song
to eleven music recording and publishing companies. 7
On the other hand, the Bee Gees had composed over 160 songs
and their records, tapes, and sheet music had been distributed
worldwide, with some of their albums selling more than 30 million
copies. 3' The expert witness was of the opinion that the two songs
could not have been written independent of each other because
they had such striking similarities.39 Although the jury returned a
verdict in favor of Selle, the trial court granted the Bee Gees'
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.4" The court
relied primarily on Selle's inability to demonstrate that the Bee
Gees had access to "Let It End" and stated that without access,
regardless of how similar the two compositions may be, a claim of
copyright infringement could not stand.41 Therefore, because Selle
failed to establish a basis from which the jury could reasonably
infer that the Bee Gees had access to "Let It End" and because he
did not prove "striking similarity" between the two songs, the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision.42

35. 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984).
36. Id. at 898.
37. Id. Three of the companies did not respond, and eight of the companies
returned the materials to Selle. Id.
38. Id. at 898-99.
39. Id. at 899. Arrand Parsons, the only expert witness to testify at trial, was
a music professor at Northwestern University who had extensive professional
experience. Id. Dr. Parsons used several charts and a comparative recording
which was prepared under his direction for his testimony. Id.
40. Selle, 741 F.2d at 899.
41. Id. at 899-900.
42. Id. at 905-06.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/3
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D. The Jackson Cases
Michael Jackson, one of the most popular modem composers in
the world, has been the target of recent copyright infringement
litigation, where he prevailed in two separate actions: Cartierv.
Jackson43 and Smith v. Jackson.' In Cartier, singer-songwriter
Crystal Cartier sued Michael Jackson and others for copyright
infringement of her song entitled "Dangerous" that she allegedly
wrote in 1985 and recorded in October of 1990. 41 Cartier claimed
that in January 1988, she recorded "Dangerous" as part of another
song entitled "Player."'
Jackson also recorded a song called
"Dangerous" in September of 1990.' 7 Jackson asserted that he
wrote his version of 'Dangerous" in 1985 during a collaboration
with William Bottrell." In attempting to prove that Jackson had
access to her version of "Dangerous" before September 1990,
Cartier tried to demonstrate that she distributed approximately 25
demo tapes of "Player" to people who were close to Jackson in Los
Angeles. 49 However, Cartier had no remaining copies of the demo
tape; she claimed that her entire supply of cassettes was depleted
and that since the original recording was created on a rented master
tape that was recycled by the recording studio, that copy had also
vanished."
In response to a motion in limine, the district court excluded the
secondary evidence that Cartier wanted to introduce in order to
prove the contents of the cassettes. 5 The basis for this exclusion
43. 59 F.3d 1046 (10th Cir. 1995).
44. 84 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 1996). In addition to the copyright claims, the
plaintiffs also brought a RICO claim against defendants, alleging that Jackson,
Richie, and Temperton's dissemination and marketing of the songs were mail
and wire fraud predicate acts under RICO. Id. at 1216. The court held that the
plaintiffs' RICO claims were actually based on copyright infringement, and
because copyright infringement is not a RICO predicate act under 18 U.S.C.
1961, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' RICO claims. Id.
45. Cartier,59 F.3d at 1047.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1047-48.
50. Cartier,59 F.3d at 1048.
51. Id. In order to show the contents of the lost cassettes, Cartier attempted
to introduce chord and lyric charts of the version of "Dangerous" that was on
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

9

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 3

DEPAULJ ART& ENT. LAW

[Vol. VIII:23

was that Cartier had not made a significantly diligent search for the
copies of the demo tapes. 2 The jury rendered a verdict in favor of
Jackson and Cartier appealed.53 Affirming the ruling of the district
court in favor of Jackson54 , the Tenth Circuit interpreted the district
court's conclusion that the secondary evidence was not a fair or
accurate depiction of the original tape as a finding that the
secondary recordings would mislead the jury.
Michael Jackson also played the role of defendant in copyright
infringement litigation in Smith v. Jackson,55 where he and others,
including Lionel Richie and Rod Temperton, were sued by Robert
Smith and Reynaud Jones for alleged infringement of six of the
plaintiffs songs.5 6 The plaintiffs did not argue that the defendants
copied the lyrics or any large parts of the music; instead, they
alleged that Jackson and the others misappropriated musical
"motives" from each of the plaintiff s works. 7
The trial court granted summary judgment for Jackson on several
of the infringement claims because the plaintiffs had failed to rebut
the defendants' experts declarations that the allegedly infiinging
motives were actually unprotected "scenes a faire."58 The jury
concluded, on the three surviving claims that went to trial, that
none of the defendants' compositions were "substantially similar"
her demo tapes. Id. She also tried to introduce a recording that recreated this
version, which was recorded in May 1992 from her memory of the version that
was distributed two years earlier. Id.
52. Id. Cartier's search for the demo tapes entailed calling her friends and
former colleagues, searching her home and her storage materials, and
unsuccessfully contacting the record companies that received her demo tapes.
Id.
53. Id. at 1047.
54. Id. at 1049-50.

55. 84 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 1996).
56. Id. at 1216.

57. Id. The court defined "motive" as a short musical phrase which is usually
comprised of only a few notes. Id. at 1216, n.1. Some of the alleged
infringements claimed by the plaintiffs included that Jackson's and Richie's "We
Are The World" infringed on one motive from plaintiffs' "If There Be You,"
that Jackson's
"The Girl is Mine" infringed on one motive from plaintiffs' "Don't Let the
Sunshine Catch You Crying," and that Temperton's "Thriller" infringed on four
motives from plaintiffs "Run on Manchild." Id. at 1216.
58. Id. The court noted that "scenes a faire" referred to a motive that is so
trite or common that it is not protectable under copyright law. Id, at 1216 n.3.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/3
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to any of the plaintiffs' songs under the ordinary lay listener test.59
Since the jury answered "no" to the "substantially similar"
question, that was the end of the case.' The plaintiffs appealed to
the Ninth Circuit claiming that the jury should have been asked
about "access" first so that. they could consider "access" in
deciding whether the songs were "substantially similar."61 This
contention was rejected by the court, which stated that "[a]lthough
access was relevant to the extrinsic test, we have not incorporated
considerations of access into the intrinsic 'lay listener' inquiry."'62
Therefore, the court affirmed the ruling of the district court in favor
of Jackson and the other defendants.63

Ut. WHAT CONSTITUTES FRivOLITY: A LACK OF GUIDANCE FROM
THE COURTS

While courts have provided the standard of proof necessary for
determining whether copyright infingement has occurred, the
courts have not been so generous in outlining what constitutes
frivolity in a music copyright case. "Frivolousness, like madness
and obscenity, is more readily recognized than cogently defined."'
However, it is of peculiar circumstance that the case which
propounded the standard of proof for copyright infringement was a
case that involved a most dubious plaintiff.65 In Arnstein v. Porter,
Cole Porter survived an infringement action instituted by Ira
59. Id. at 1216-17.
60. Jackson, 84 F.3d. at 1220.
61. Id.
62. Id. The court stated that it used a two-part test for determining whether
two compositions are substantially similar. Id. at 1218. The "extrinsic" test is
based on external, objective criteria, and considers whether two works share a
similarity of expression and ideas. Id. Expert testimony and analytic discussion
of a work are appropriate for the extrinsic test. Id. If the plaintiff satisfies the
extrinsic test, then the subjective "intrinsic" test comes into play to inquire
whether an "ordinary, reasonable observer" would find that a substantial
similarity of expression of the shared idea existed between the two works. Id.
63. Id. at 1221.
64. Robert Hermann, Frivolous CriminalAppeals, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 701,

705 (1972).
65. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 464.

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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Arnstein, along with a multitude of other composers that Arnstein
sued through several lawsuits during the 1930's and 1940's for
music copyright infringement.66 In his original complaint against
Porter, Amstein prayed for "at least one million dollars out of the
millions the defendant has earned -and is earning out of all the
plagiarism."67 Arnstein claimed that Porter "had stooges right
along to follow me, watch me, and live in the same apartment with
me," and asserted that his apartment had been ransacked several
times." When Amstein was questioned about how he knew that
Porter had something to do with any of these "burglaries," he
stated, "I don't know that he had to do with it, but I only know he
could have ... many of my compositions had been published. No
66. Id., See e.g. Amstein v Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d 275 (2d
Cir. 1936); Amstein v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 137 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1943). The
litigation that Porter was entangled in with Amstein has been mentioned in
biographies concerning the famous composer-lyricist:
Another annoyance for Cole that practically coincided with his bad
press for Seven Lively Arts was the report from Warner Brothers on
December 27, 1944, that tunesmith Ira Arnstein, a persistent litigant in
the courts against famous songwriters, had threatened suit,
presumably over the studio's planned production of Cole's movie
biography. According to the studio's legal department, Amstein
claimed that Cole had plagiarized a number of his compositions and
submitted various manuscripts as well as printed material to support
this allegation. In their report Warner Brothers made clear that they
considered Amstein's claim "absolutely ridiculous," but warned that
"if Arnstein follows his usual course he can become an awful
nuisance." And Amstein did. He sued Cole for a million dollars,
claiming plagiarism. In the two-week-long jury trial that followed,
Monty Woolley, Deems Taylor, and Sigmund Spaeth all appeared in
Cole's defense to support his contention that he had never taken
material from Amstein. Cole also testified that he neither knew
Amstein nor was familiar with his work. When the case finally went
to the jury it was dismissed as being without merit after a deliberation
of nearly two hours. But though Cole won the case, it was perhaps a s
a result of the experience gained from this trial that, when asked if he
ever went out without a carnation in his boutonniere, Cole answered,
"Only when I'm being sued, because a carnation in the buttonhole
never helps your case before a jury."
Charles Schwartz, COLE PORTER: A BIOGRAPHY 220-21 (1977).
67. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 467.
68. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/3
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one had to break in and steal them."6 9 Yet in his depositions,
Amstein gave no direct evidence that Porter saw or heard any of
his compositions.7"
Cole Porter moved for dismissal of this action on the ground of
"vexatiousness."' Attached to his motion papers were the court
records of five prior copyright infringement suits brought by
Arnstein against other persons in which judgments had been
entered after trial against Amstein.72 The Second Circuit believed
that it would be improper to give weight to any other actions that
the plaintiff may have lost.73 However, the court did state that
"[w]hen a particular suit is vexatious, sometimes at its conclusion
the court can give some redress to the victorious party. Perhaps the
Legislature can and should meet the problem more effectively."74
Although the court refused to strike Arnstein's demand for a jury
trial, the court claimed that his testimony, as to the "stooges" and
the like, did seem a bit "fantastic."' It seemed the court was on
the verge of establishing that Arnstein was guilty of bringing a
frivolous lawsuit against Porter, yet it declined to take advantage of
this opportunity to spell out factors which might be relevant in
defining what comprised a frivolous lawsuit. In his dissent, Judge
Clark mentioned several issues which could possibly suggest that
Amstein brought a frivolous copyright infringement claim against
Porter. Judge Clark claimed that Arnstein's vague and reckless
charges of burglary were a repeated feature of his plagiarism
cases.76 He also stated, "[o]f course it is error to deny trial when
there is a genuine dispute of facts; but it is just as much error-perhaps more in cases of hardship, or where impetus is given to
strike suits--to deny or postpone judgment where the ultimate legal
' 77
result is clearly indicated.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 478.
71. Id. at 474
72. Arnstein, 154 F.2dat 474.
73. Id. at 475.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 469.
76. Id. at 478 n.3.
77. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 480. Judge Clark's statement is aligned with the
idea that section 505 of the Copyright Act exists in order to encourage people to
assert colorable
copyright
claims. NBC2016
v. Sonnebom, 630 F. Supp. 524, 542
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Although Arnstein may be regarded as a plaintiff who blatantly
institutes baseless lawsuits,7" certain other cases have suggested
that frivolity exists in copyright infiingement litigation. In the
Cartierv. Jackson79 case, the comparison tapes that Cartier wanted
to introduce as secondary evidence contained excerpts from both
Jackson's and Cartier's versions of "Dangerous," but the tempo of
the Jackson tape was slowed and the key of the song was altered
from the original key in order to accommodate this slowing.8"
Various excerpts "were looped back on themselves" in order to
repeat musical phrases that were not repeated in either Jackson's
nor Cartier's original song." Also, the tapes spliced together parts
of the choruses that were not adjacent in the original versions.8"
Another curious factor is that neither Cartier nor her attorneys
attempted to compel any of the record companies that she allegedly
83
sent demo tapes to respond to her requests to return the tapes.
Even in the wake of Fogerty v. Fantasy,Inc., 4 which lifted the
requirement of finding frivolity 85 and demonstrated that it is not
always obvious that a frivolous lawsuit is filed, courts should still
86
be amenable to recognizing evident elements of frivolity in cases.
(D. Conn. 1985).
78. Another example of Arnstein's alleged frivolity can be found in Arnstein
v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 137 F.2d 410, 412 (2nd Cir. 1943), where the court
alluded to the aggravation in dealing with Arnstein's ludicrous claims of
infringement:
The appellant having failed to prove access seeks to have copying
inferred from the similarity of the compositions. Here again he is met
by the findings of the trial judge who in a most painstaking way heard
the songs played again and again. With the relatively few musical
intervals that exist and the vast amount of music in the public domain
it is rash to infer that a sequence that may be found in a melody is
copied from any particular song containing the same sequence, rather
than taken from other sources. Id..
79. 59 F.3d at1049.
80. Id.

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1048.
84. 510 U.S. 517 (1994).

85. Id. at 531-32.
86. Hermann, supra note 64, at 715. Although Mr. Helmann's article
discusses the topic of frivolous criminal appeals, guidance for what a frivolous
claim in any type of action may entail can be gleaned from his suggestions:
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/3
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The incentive for discovering that frivolous elements exist in an
infringement claim is that a court can dispose of the case before it
goes to trial by looking at evidence, thereby affecting judicial
economy by eliminating the need for the parties to go to trial.
IV. LENDING A HELPING HAND TO DEFENDANTS: FOGERTY v.

FANTASY, INC.

The recent jurisprudential enactment of Fogerty v. Fantasy,
Inc.8 7 is a treasure trove to composers trying to recover attorney's
fees spent on copyright infringement defenses. In Fogerty, the
United States Supreme Court agreed to hear singer/songwriter John
Fogerty's petition for review of a Ninth Circuit ruling on a suit
bought against him in 1985 by Fantasy, Inc., his former music
publishing and distributing company. 8 Fogerty had written the
song "Run Through the Jungle" in 1970 and sold the exclusive
publishing rights to Fantasy.89 In 1985, Fogerty published another
song entitled "The Old Man Down the Road," attained a copyright
for the song and authorized Warner Brothers to distribute it.9"
Fantasy filed an action for copyright infringement, claiming that
"The Old Man Down the Road" was actually "Run Through the
Jungle" with new words.91 The jury returned a verdict in favor of
Fogerty, finding "The Old Man Down the Road" did not infringe
on "Run Through the Jungle."92 Although Fogerty prevailed at
trial, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of Fogerty's motion for
attorney's fees.93 The court declined to abandon its "dual standard"
"Indeed, a frivolous appeal can be functionally, if not very helpfully, defined as
one in which a capable lawyer devoted to his client's best interests, after
conscientiously searching the record and researching the law, can find nothing
to argue with a straight face." Id.

87. 510 U.S. 517 (1994).
88. Id. John Fogerty was the leader of Creedence Clearwater Revival (CCR),
a band recognized as one of the greatest American rock and roll groups of all
time. Id. at 519 n.2. CCR's distinctive style of music, which had a "southern
country and blues feel" to it, was dubbed "swamp rock" by the media. Id.
89. Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1526 (9th Cir. 1993).

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
Published
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for awarding attorney's fees under section 505 of the Copyright
Act, which generally awards attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs
as a matter of course. However, defendants must show that the
original claim was brought in bad faith or was frivolous.94
The Court decided that section 505 no longer requires a
prevailing defendant to make a showing of frivolity or bad faith in
order to recover attorney's fees in a copyright action.95 Instead, the
Court adopted the "evenhanded" approach, where no distinction is
made between prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants.96
The Court further held that attorney's fees are to be awarded to
prevailing parties only as a matter of discretion by a court.97 It
considered a list of non-exclusive factors to be considered in
awarding attorney's fees to prevailing copyright litigants, including
"frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the
factual and in the legal components of the case) and the need in
particular circumstances
to advance considerations
of
compensation and deterrence."98 Fogerty was awarded reasonable
attorney's fees and costs pursuant to section 505, in the amount of
$1,351,369.15. 9' This is the highest amount ever awarded to date
for attorney's fees in a copyright infringement case, and is likely to
have a major effect on quelling the amount of frivolous copyright
suits that abound in the music industry."
V. MAKING THE SUCCESSFUL FRIVOLITY CLAIM: OTHER

APPENDAGES OF LAW TO ADD TO THE FOGERTY CASE

In order to abolish the filing of fivolous claims in music
copyright litigation, practitioners can combine the Fogerty case
94. Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 521.
95. Id. at 535.
96. Id. at 536.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 535 n.19, citing Lieb v. Topstone Indus., 788 F.2d 151, 156 ( 9th

Cir. 1986) (emphasis added).
99. Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6197.
100. "It's my feeling, and the feeling of those in the music industry that I've
talked to... that, yes, there will probably be fewer frivolous cases on the part of
plaintiffs." Quote from Fogerty attorney Kenneth Sidle, in Bill Holland, Court
Rules That Fogerty May Seek Attorney's Fees, BILLBOARD, March 12, 1994, at

6.
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with several other existing legal premises to effectuate a desired
result for the defense of their clients.10' Although the main hope of
constructing this defense would be to serve as a deterrent for filing
frivolous lawsuits, it would also serve as an effective method of
collecting remedies and restitution for defendants who prevail at
trial. The fact that attorney's fees are seldom granted to a
successful defendant and that sanctions and disciplinary measures
are rarely brought against or enforced upon a lawyer who brings a
meritless claim allows this deceptive practice to continue.
A. Section 505
Section 505 of the Copyright Act is perhaps the most powerful
factor to be appended to the Fogerty case in establishing a
deterrent for the filing of frivolous lawsuits by plaintiffs.' Under
101 The scope of this paper is limited to crafting an argument for disposing
of frivolous infringement claims through laws already in existence. For a
discussion on suggested actions that may be pursued by a defendant songwriter,
See Siegel, supra notel, at 25:
What other options are open to the attorney seeking to ameliorate
[A] forceful
the broad exposure of a sitting duck songwriter client? ...
argument can be made that those sharing in the benefits of a song's
success (for example, the music publisher or record company) should
also be willing to share in the risks of an unfounded challenge to this
underlying copyright.

Id. Mr. Siegel also entertains the idea of a clause in the publisher/songwriter
contract for the reimbursement of partial costs and attorney's fees in defense of a
palpably frivolous infringement claim. Id. "Another area of potential protection
is insurance. In a rare case, the writer might be able to convince his music
publisher to add the writer's name to the publisher's policy as an additional
insured (perhaps for contributory fees). Id.
102. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1996) provides:
In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may
allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the
United States or of an officer thereof. Except as otherwise provided
by this title, the court may also award a reasonable attorney's fee to
the prevailing party as part of the costs.
pay attorney's fees under the Copyright
of a party to 2016
requirement
Id. Also,bythe
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Section 505, reasonable attorney's fees can be awarded to
prevailing litigants in copyright infringement claims. 10 3 Yet,
section 505 is not applied in every case; even after Fogerty, courts
still have the discretion to uphold or deny a prevailing party's
request for attorney's fees and costs."°
There are certain factors to consider when evaluating a case for
the award of attorney's fees."° Frivolity is one of those factors."
Attorneys should emphasize this when an action seems to be
frivolous in its claim of copyright infringement.
Some cases have held that attorney's fees should be routinely
awarded under section 505.107 Defense attorneys should urge for a
stronger application of these holdings to their own cases. At the
very least, a prevailing composer should be entitled to attorney's
fees incurred for the defense of a frivolous claim, which could only
be considered restitution for his out-of-pocket expenses.
B. Rule 11
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a
Act seems to be analogous to the imposition of sanctions on attorneys for filing
frivolous claims. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
103. Id.
104. Fogerty, 510 U.S .at 533 (1994). The Court stated, "The statute [section
505] says that 'the court may also award a reasonable attorney's fee to the
prevailing party as part of the costs.' The word 'may' clearly connotes
discretion. The automatic awarding of attorney's fees to the prevailing party
would pretermit the exercise of that discretion." Id.
105. Id. at 534 (citing the Lieb factors, namely frivolousness, motivation,
objective unreasonableness, both in the legal and factual components of the
case, and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of
compensation and deterrence).
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Jasperilla Music Co. v. Wing's Lounge Ass'n., 837 F. Supp.
159, 162 (S. D. W. Va. 1993) (holding that an award of attorney's fees under
section 505 is the rule rather than the exception, and the court need not find that
the case is exceptional in order to award them); Engel v. Teleprompter, 732 F.2d
1238, 1241 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that attorney's fees should be routinely
awarded under 505 and that the award should be the rule rather than the
exception); Little Mole Music v. Spike Invest., Inc., 720 F. Supp. 751, 757
(W.D. Mo. 1989) (holding that although attorney's fees are awarded at the
discretion of the trial court, the award is the rule rather than the exception and
attorney's fees should be awarded routinely).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/3
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lawyer make no frivolous claim in his representations in court.' °8
Rule 11 also provides for attorney's fees in the event a lawyer does
make a frivolous argument °9 In reality, however, Rule 11
sanctions are rarely levied against attorneys for instituting
frivolous actions, even though there is widespread concern for this
1
practice.Y
"Frivolous litigation has been attributed to various
characteristics of American society: our litigious instinct, our
emphasis on substantive rights and entitlements, an overpopulation
of lawyers in need of business, and a procedural system that is
based on an ideal of open access to courts."''
Courts should not
be tolerant of frivolity, and lawyers should make full

108. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 provides in pertinent part:
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether
by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written
motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying
that to the best of the persont s knowledge, information, and belief,
formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,-- ...
2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for

the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law.Id.
109. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c) provides in pertinent part:
Sanctions. If after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond,
the court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court
may, subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate
sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated
subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation.Id..
110. See Elihu Root, Note, The Dynamics of Rule 11: PreventingFrivolous
Litigation By Demanding ProfessionalResponsibility, 61 N.Y.U.L. REV.300,

301-02 (1986):
The litigiousness of American society has been the focal point of
much recent debate over judicial reform. As more lawsuits than ever
are being filed, docket congestion grows, making it hard for even the
most righteous cases to be heard within a reasonable time. Whether
or not frivolous litigation is principally responsible for this court
congestion, it is perceived as a serious and perennial problem.Id..
111. by
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implementation of Rule 11 in order to assist courts in imposing
fines on other lawyers who file frivolous claims.
C. ProfessionalResponsibility
A lawyer can be subject to disciplinary action from the bar for
making a frivolous claim under the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. 12 Like Rule 11 sanctions, attorneys are almost never
disciplined for instituting frivolous copyright infringement actions.
Lawyers should propose to courts that professional discipline
should be a more readily used option for their peers who bring
baseless claims. "As officers of the judicial system, lawyers are
responsible for controlling the quality of suits that are litigated."' .
This should be strongly considered, especially in light of the
current trend of public opinion which perceives the legal
profession as being steadily denigrated over time. 14
D. British Rule
Americans stand to learn much from the so-called "British
Rule," which allows for automatic attorney's fees, while the
"American Rule" demands the awarding of attorney's fees be left
112. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 3.1 (1996) provides in
pertinent part, "A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not
frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law." Id.
113. See Root, supra note 110, at 303.
114. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 1 & 9; See also C. Garrison Lepow,
Deconstructing Los Angeles or a Secret Fax From Magritte Regarding
PostliterateLegal Reasoning: A Critiqueof Legal Education, 26 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 69, 70 (1992). "Many people perceive the work of lawyers as a powerful,
prohibitively destructive force. Id. Lawyers are 'like nuclear warheads. They
have theirs so you need yours--but once you use them they fluck up everything.
They're only good in their silos.' Id. at 70, n.3, citing JERRY STERNER, OTHER
PEOPLE'S MONEY 58 (1989). One of popular culture's conventional topics is that
lawyers hold different values than the average person." Id. at 70, n.4, citing to
Murphy Brown (CBS television broadcasts, Nov. 14, 1988 to present), which
depicts Brown constantly reminding a corporate lawyer not to let his tail get
caught in the door as he leaves. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/3
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to the discretion of the court." '
The American Rule has
encouraged the initiation of frivolous litigation. Individuals can
simply gain access to discovery which they use to determine if they
have any claim at all, instead of implementing it to discover
evidence that would support a legitimate claim." 6 Also, the
American Rule enables plaintiffs to bring nuisance or "strike suits"
against defendants, which are baseless actions brought solely to
force the defendant into a settlement for an amount somewhat less
than the potential cost of full-fledged litigation. 1 7 The only
common law jurisdiction in which legal expenses, including
attorney's fees, are not automatically shifted to the unsuccessful
party is that of the United States.1
On the other hand, the British Rule is premised on providing full
compensation to the prevailing party, not on punishing the losing
party or deterring frivolous litigation, although the rule has had the
effect of reducing frivolous litigation. 19 John Fogerty attempted to
advance the British Rule in his argument to the Supreme Court, but
failed.' Nevertheless, this does not render the argument null. The
proponent of applying the British Rule can use the rule in order to
enhance the defense's argument for collecting attorney's fees in the
event that a frivolous copyright infringement action is found to be
instituted against him.
VI. CONCLUSION

Unscrupulous opportunists can be found in all walks of life,
whether rich or poor, famous or unknown or successful or
unsuccessful. Sometimes they are found in the music litigation
arena, projecting wholly meritless copyright infringement claims
against successful songwriters in an attempt to take advantage of
the independently created works of the wrongfully accused
defendants. The institution of frivolous copyright infringement
115. Fogerty, 510U.S. at518.
116. See Root, supra note 110, at 306.
117. Id.
118. Id.at 304.
119. Id. at 307-08.
120. by
Fogerty,
U.S. at 518.
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actions is a slap in the face of successful songwriters and a weight
around the neck of judicial economy. This paper begs the attention
of those intimately involved in this area, mainly judges and
practitioners in the music industry, to hone their legal skills to
rectify and hopefully abolish this dishonest and undignified
practice. The answer may lie in a concerted effort for creating a
manageable deterrence plan, followed by the vigorous enforcement
of available remedies for defendants when plaintiffs persist in
filing frivolous music copyright infringement actions.
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